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Abstract
When an infrastructure is used to process complex workows by way of an Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS), network monitoring becomes mandatory to ensure the required quality of service and to optimize
the utilization of the whole infrastructure.
In this paper we explore this scenario, evaluate the issues that come with the network monitoring
operation, and propose a practical solution. To support our claims, we introduce a network monitoring
infrastrucure that has been implemented as a proof of concept for the foundations of our solution.
Keywords: Network Monitoring, Network Measurement, XML Schema Description, Grid infrastructure,
Service Oriented Architecture, CoreGRID.
1 Introduction
The monitoring of network resources, to evaluate metrics like available bandwidth, or delay jitter, is a
key issue in the management of distributed infrastructures. In fact, complex workows supported by such
infrastructures may stress the performance of communication facilities, for instance when they require the
displacement of large amounts of data. To ensure that the performance of the networking infrastructure
meets the demand, the performance of each network element that takes an active part in the distributed
computation must be monitored before triggering a data transfer operation, or prior to engaging in a data
intensive computation. A use case that is presently quite popular occurs when the Grid paradigms are
applied to an IaaS infrastructure.
Thus the purpose of the monitoring activity is to provide preliminar information about the availabil-
ity of network resources, and to verify network resources performance during the operation. Note that
here the importance of end-to-end Network Monitoring is emphasized, since the computational abstraction
represented by the workow implemented over the distributed infrastructure, possibily using network virtu-
alization techniques, is incompatible with the classical link level view of the communication infrastructure
[2].
Here we have to take into account an issue that dierentiates end-to-end network monitoring from other
instances of resource monitoring. If we look at how its complexity scales up with the size of the system, we
observe that, while other resource monitoring activities (for instance the assessment of the available storage
space) scales linearly with the size of the system, end-to-end network monitoring potentially grows with the
square of the size of the system, and so does the quantity of data collected during a time unit.
To make a straightforward example, let us consider a system with n end-points, with no hints about which
end-to-end network element is being used for a massive data transfer: network monitoring will necessarily
cover all of the n*(n-1) network elements, possibily wasting most of the resources dedicated to its operation,
and to the storage of its results.
Although simplistic, the example justies our claim that end-to-end network monitoring must be selective
in its targets: only a small fraction of end-to-end routes can be monitored at each time. As a consequence,
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whatever be the criteria to select which are the network elements that need to be monitored, some sort
of distributed infrastructure must exist that allows the selective activation of network monitoring. Such
an infrastructure is not needed for other kinds of monitoring activity: for instance, data about computing
resources can be collected continuously, and historical records kept, while preserving system scalability. In a
sense, the peculiar nature of network monitoring pushes in the direction of a Service Oriented approach for
its implementation, where a client submits a (network monitoring) request that is processed in an opaque
way by a service provider.
In addition, network monitoring tools exhibit relevant peculiarities in their operation. When we consider
other kinds of resources, like processing capabilities, the only compatibility requirement that applies to a
measurement tool is that its results are compliant to a standard, for interoperability reasons. When we
come to network monitoring tools, we observe that certain network monitoring methodologies require some
sort of cooperation from the environment: even the simplest tool of this kind, the icmp ping, requires that
its packets are propagated, which cannot be given for granted. More complex tools further require that
the end-points participating in a monitoring activity share some functionality: the well-known Iperf tool
belongs to this category. Such fact may make the deployment of such network measurement methodologies
awkward. According with a widely accepted terminology, we aggregate them in the category of active network
monitoring techinques. The basic idea behind these tools is to inject a trac pattern, and extrapolate from
its treatment a pattern-independent metric. However this generalization step is in itself critical; the result
may depend from hidden variables, for instance the credentials used when performing the measurement.
The analysis of the trac produced by the application itself is in many cases a more appropriate solution:
as opposed to the previous, we call this one passive network monitoring. It is immediately applicable to the
monitoring of an ongoing application that makes use of network resources, but can be adapted also to the
case of a preventive monitoring; for instance, to assess the performability of a given operation. In this latter
case, a benchmark test, using the same pattern used in the real operation, is submitted to the infrastructure,
and the performance of the end-to-end network element is observed. It is relevant to stress that in both
cases network monitoring is mainly under control of the client application.
We identify two distinct approaches for the implementation of a passive monitoring solution:
 by analysis of the log les produced by the bandwidth consuming activity,
 by measurement of the trac on network interfaces that are traversed by labelled trac.
In both cases we observe that the monitoring activity is strictly related with the application: it is the
task of the application, or of the workow manager that orchestrates its execution, to congure the data
acquisition phase, and to manage its results.
Another aspect that must be taken into account is that the network monitoring infrastructure should
operate regardless of the tools that actually perform the logging or monitoring activity: in other terms, it is
not the role of the infrastructure to dictate which back-end sensor is supported, and which is not. In other
terms, although the restless evolution of networking technologies stimulates the creation of new network
monitoring methodologies, this fact cannot entail the upgrade of the infrastructure. Therefore a long lived
framework should be agnostic with respect to the back-end tools used to carry out the task. Instead it
is advisable an architecture that envisions monitoring tools that can be dynamically plugged in a running
deployment, possibly wrapped in an appropriate adapter. As a general rule it will be the task of the user
application to indicate the tool appropriate to carry out the measurement, although a default back-end
sensor may exist for certain measurement.
For a similar reason limiting the scope to a specic representation of the measurements is regarded as an
intrusion in user discretionality: the data can be encoded in any suitable format, that may be customized
by the user and tool-aware. Similarly to the way the Real Time Protocol (RTP) works, the monitoring
framework we have in mind treats network measurements as opaque payload.
Summarizing, we establish four cornerstones for an end-to-end network monitoring architecture capable
of managing the scalability challenge oered by distributed infrastructures that support complex, network
intensive workows:
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 demand driven: its activity is not set by default, or with static congurations, but controlled by the
workow manager;
 passive monitoring oriented: only application-related trac is analyzed in order to obtain the requested
measurements;
 tool transparent: a new network monitoring tool can be made dynamically pluggable with minimal
coding eort;
 encoding transparent: the network monitoring infrastructure should not interfere with the data struc-
ture that represents measurements.
Security issues need to be taken into account and access to network monitoring has to be restricted,
its footprint being possibly relevant. In order to keep under control the monitoring activity, we consider
as appropriate to delegate such activity to specialized, suitably congured units. Security concerns also
hit network monitoring results; measurements should be collected and published only after checking the
credentials of the requester, and they should generally regarded as subject to security restrictions.
This paper describes a proof of concept implementation, named gd2, that follows the above guidelines.
In summary, it monitors the trac within a set of end-points clustered into domains, and is operated by a
number of agents in charge of controlling network monitoring activity. These agents receive client requests
that describe the required monitoring activity, that may target inter-domain routes.
The paper is organized as follows: after introducing an abstract view of the architecture, we detail the
internal structure of the basic agent, the Network Monitoring Agent, and introduce the formal description
of the piece of data in charge of describing an instance of network monitoring activity. Finally we discuss
the scalability of our approach.
2 The components of a demand driven network monitoring archi-
tecture
The Network Monitoring Infrastructure concept introduced in the previous section identies implicitly three
distinct functionalities: producers of trac measurements, infrastructure agents that deliver requests to pro-
ducers, and consumers, that issue requests and consume measurements. Such a triad corresponds, in spirit,
to the one introduced in a Grid Forum report [1] that laid the foundations of the Network Monitoring Work-
ing Group [8] of that association. However, we note one relevant dierence with respect to this architecture
in the role played by the infrastructure agents, that replace the directory block in the referenced report. In
our case we refer to a service which routes requests from consumers to producers. Such routing requires
coordination within the network monitoring infrastructure, and must enforce security policies that restrict
access to control functions. Both facts indicate the need of restricting the set of agents enabled to perform
such actions, avoiding to implement direct access between consumer and producer. Therefore the role played
by agents in the network monitoring infrastructure is more similar to that of a mediator, as in npm [10],
discussed in section 3.
In gd2 architecture, an example of it is in gure 1, each Network Monitoring Agent (Agent, in the rest of
this paper) takes the responsibility of managing a number of Network Monitoring Sensors (Sensors, in the
rest of the paper), and of agents enabled to submit network monitoring requests, the Network Monitoring
Clients (Clients, in the rest of the paper). Such a set of entities is indicated as a domain. There are good
reasons to introduce such concept (roughly the same that motivate its introduction in many aspects of
networking):
 reducing complexity { one Agent concentrates the interface to the entities inside the domain;
 security containment { security issues can be managed using local credentials inside the domain;
3
EpEp
EpEp
S
A
Ep
AcAb
Sc
Ep
AaEp Sa
Domain B
Domain A
Wm
Domain C
Figure 1: gd2 components in a system with 3 Domains: E units represent generic monitoring endpoints, A
labeled units representNetwork Monitoring Agents, S units represent Network Monitoring Sensors
 limiting global state access { only Agents have access to the global state, thus simplifying its manage-
ment and ensuring security.
In Figure 1 the network is composed of 3 domains, Agents are represented by hexagons, Sensors by circles,
network monitoring end-points by squares. A client of the network monitoring infrastructure Wm is placed
in the C domain.
The arrows in Figure 1 illustrate the processing of a monitoring session. Let us consider that the client
submits a complex workow, which requires a massive data transfer between the two end-points connected
by double arrows, located in domain A and B. The path connecting the two end-points starts with a branch
inside Domain B, goes through the backbone that interconnects the three domains, enters Domain A through
an internal backbone and nally reaches the target end-point.
The client Wm assembles a Request, and forwards it to Ac, a local Agent (dotted line), using a soap
call. We consider that client credentials to submit requests have validity local to the domain.
Ac inspects the request and queries the dns (or another equivalent service describing domain topology)
in order to decide where it is appropriate to route the request. Before being forwarded, the request is
encapsulated into an envelope, and signed by Ac. The request is then routed to Ab, the Agent in domain B,
using another soap call. Unfortunately, there is no sensor available in domain B. In fact, the information
about sensor capabilities is local to the domain, and is not global to the whole network: this justies the
non-optimality of Ac decision. Agent Ab, after checking request signature, concludes that it must route the
request towards another candidate, and it selects Aa, an Agent of the domain hosting the other endpoint.
The Ac signature in the request is replaced with Ab signature.
When Aa receives the request, after checking signature validity, it assigns the monitoring activity to Sa:
the envelope is removed and the original request fromWm is used to (re)congure Sa, which starts collecting
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measurements according with the request.
Measurements are now packaged as payload of udp packets, streamed along a route that proceed back-
wards with respect to the path followed by the request: from Aa to Ab, to Ac. At each step the packet is
signed by the sending agent. Finally Ac retrieves the payload and returns it to the client Wm. Data are
streamed as long as the monitoring activity takes place, as indicated in the Network Monitoring request.
Concerning security aspects of our infrastructure, we note that we identify three distinct scopes for
credentials. One is local to amonitoring session: the client and the sensor may agree and implement a specic
security policy, for instance encrypting the data stream from the sensor to the client. The implementationof
this agreement falls outside the scope of our infrastructure. Another extends within a single domain, as in
the case of the signature used by Wm in order to access the local Agent, or the capability of a given Agent
to control a Sensor. The last one denes the membership of the Agents, and its scope should extend to
the whole Network. In essence any Agent should be able, upon receiving a request from an unknown peer,
to check its signature. We observe that the problem is already solved in Internet applications, and we do
not investigate it further: an ldap directory containing public keys, or a dns based solution would t the
purpose.
Also the information needed to route the requests can be retrieved from the dns; inappropriate routing
decisions, due to the assumption that the dns stores only associations between ip addresses and domains,
can be compensated by successive routing, as illustrated in the example. A directory of sensors, and related
capabilities, available within the domain can be maintained, without incurring into scalability issues. The
creation of loops is prevented since the route is recorded into the request, and routing decisions are also
recorded in the soft state of each node: the presence of a soft state is needed to route the stream containing
monitoring data.
The utilization of the reverse route to stream data packets is also introduced for reasons related to
security: domain rewalls can be congured in order to allow incoming soap calls directed to agents. Once
the agent has checked the credentials of the peer agent, udp packets can be accepted from that source for
the duration of the monitoring session.
As anticipated, the overall infrastructure does not make any assumption neither on the tool used to
perform network measurements, nor on the nature of the measurements themselves. The adaptation of a
new tool in the gd2 infrastructure consists in writing a plugin component that is in charge of: i) driving the
(possibly remote) Sensor using the data contained in the request, and ii) encoding the data returned by the
sensor as specied in the request.
In order to have a better understanding of the operation of the gd2 infrastructure, we briey inspect the
internal architecture of an Agent, and next we give a closer look to the structure of the xsd document that
describes the Network Monitoring Request.
2.1 The Network Monitoring Agent
The services oered by a Network Monitoring Agent can be divided into two quite separate interfaces: one
towards the other agents (back end), and another towards local sensors and clients (front end). In gure
2 the triangular shapes indicate front end interfaces. We examine the two faces, and detail the internal
structure of the agent.
The back end interface is in charge of maintaining the membership of the Agents in the system. Such
membership is the repository of two relevant data: 1) the credentials of the Agents, needed to enforce security
in communications among the agents, and 2) the components of each domain.
As for the rst point, we assume that security mainly addresses authentication: communication among
Agents is not considered as condential. Therefore we envision a public/private key scheme as adequate
for our purpose. In order to control access to the membership, we assume the existence of an external
entity in charge of key creation and assignment. Such Authority, upon admission of a new agent, releases
a certicate, which entrusts the use of the public key as authorized by the Certication Authority. Each
Agent has access to a repository containing the certied public keys, and each communication within the
membership is accompanied by the signature of the sender (but not encrypted, at least in principle), which
can be checked using the public key.
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Figure 2: Internal architecture of a Network Monitoring Agent. The Back End interfaces are located in the
innermost stripe
The back end, upon receiving a request, submits its content to the front end in order to assess its
capability to take it up: it may happen that the information available to the Client that raises the request
is not sucient to determine the appropriate Agent for the task. In that case the front end fails to fulll a
request: however, the back end traps the failure, and resubmits the request to another Agent. We indicate
as Proxy functionality the capability of re-routing a request.
An Agent oers another back-end service for the transport of Network Monitoring data to the Client
that requested it: such transport service consists of a stream from the Sensor to the Client, and is routed
transparently through the reverse of the path used to deliver the request. The content of the stream may be
encrypted in case the network monitoring results are considered as condential, but the client(s) must own
the key to decrypt the data: here we assume that such keys are negotiated when the network monitoring
task is accepted for execution.
The front end of the Agent is in charge of interacting with Clients and Sensors inside the Domain: the
Agent accepts requests for Network Monitoring from the Clients, and drives the Sensors in order to perform
the requested network monitoring activity.
The network monitoring activity is organized into Network Monitoring Sessions (or Sessions, in the
rest of this paper). A session describes the endpoints of the Network Monitoring activity, as well as its
modality. The request must determine, either implicitly or explicitly, the features of the stream that returns
the measurement to the Client. In section 2.2 we give an XML Schema Denition for such data structure,
the Session Description.
The Clients submit their requests to the Agent as Session Descriptions. The Agent is in charge of checking
whether the request comes from an authorized client: this functionality is supported by a trust supported
internally to the domain, independent from that used within the membership of the agents. This allows the
possibility of merging domains with distinct security policies and support. The request is then passed to the
back end.
The front end, upon receiving a request from the back end, analyzes its content to assess its ability
to congure a Sensor that performs the task: to this purpose, the Agent must have access to a directory,
internal to the domain, containing the descriptions of the sensors.
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2.2 Summary of the Network Monitoring Session Description
In a Service Oriented perspective, this is the interface oered to access the Network Monitoring service: it
plays a relevant role, so it is appropriate to inspect its internal structure.
The data contained in a Network Monitoring Session Description (for short Session Description) (see also
[4] for an exhaustive description) is ideally split into three parts: one that is manipulated only by the Client,
one that is updated by Agents, together forming an envelope carrying data that are relevant for the delivery,
one that is delivered untouched from the Client to the Sensor and carries the modality of the monitoring
activity. This kernel information corresponds to the Service interface.
The rst part of the XSD document (see table 2 in the appendix) contains a SessionId string that is used
to uniquely identify a session, and used also for data stream routing. The extent of a monitoring activity is
specied by a Schedule element, which also contains indications of the resources required by the transport
of the data stream. The SessionId and the Schedule characterize a Session, and are delivered from the
Client to the Agents. They are not changed en route.
The Agents complement such data with others concerning the treatment of the Session: they are modied
by the Agents themselves, and are represented as attributes. TheRequestFrom element indicates the source
of the request, and is used for admission control: in principle, several requesters may be indicated. The
NetworkElement indicates the domains involved in the monitoring, and is used to select the appropriate
Agents to deliver the request. The Route element is modied while the request is propagated, and it is used
for backward delivery of the data stream.
The inner part of the Session Description (see table 3 in the appendix) consists of a complex element, the
MeasurementStream, that details the kind of data that are requested from the monitoring activity. Such
element is passed as is from agent to agent without being processed, and might be encrypted for security
reasons.
The MeasurementStream element is made of a common part, and another which is specic for each
measurement tool. The common part lists a CharacteristicStreamId attribute, a sampling period Sam-
plePeriod together with the monitoring end-points ( SourceIP and DestinationIP ), which together
identify and broadly characterize the monitoring activity. The tool specic part is one of a choice of ele-
ments: such elements may be specic for a given tool, or generically address any tool that may produce data
conformant to a certain standard.
3 Relationships with other works
The CoMo [7], a passive monitoring infrastructure ideated by Intel, has been the primary source of in-
spiration for our design. Our infrastructure shares many of the basic requirements of CoMo, but we focus
and propose solutions to a subset of them, and provide the tools to implement others. In addition, our
infrastructure is inuenced by a Grid-oriented approach, while CoMo tends to be telecom oriented. In the
sequel, we briey discuss these points.
The CoMo White Paper proposes three main challenges. From its abstract:
...(1) the system must allow any generic metric to be computed on the incoming query interfaces.
(2) it must provide privacy and security guarantees to the owner of the monitored link, the
network users and the users, and (3) it must be robust in the face of anomalous trac patterns...
The three challenges are specically addressed in our infrastructure: (1) using a tool-agnostic architecture
and an open communication protocol, (2) using a three layers (network-domain-session) security scheme, (3)
introducing a protocol that is not aected by the characteristics of observed trac (but we exclude from
our scope the monitoring tool). In addition we are specically concerned by scalability, and we want our
proposal to be valid in the Internet scale.
One relevant feature of our approach is that we do not propose an all-inclusive solution to the problem,
but we identify a restricted set of sub-problems and well dened interfaces for extensions. This approach
is evident in the option of considering specic monitoring tools as plugins in our infrastructure (we do not
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want to bind our proposal to a given tool), in the opaque nature of the inner parts of the protocol (we are
not interested in measurement representation), and in the reference to existing, well established tools for
agent membership maintenance (namely, ldap or dns). CoMo shares this approach, by introducing plugin
modules in its architecture, but extends the solution to cover both on-line monitoring (that does not require
storage) and o-line monitoring (that requires storage).
In the introduction we motivate the distant nature of the two network monitoring approaches: one
oriented to real-time streaming, the other mainly concerned with information storage (and indexing). The
on-line approach is ideally coupled with network-aware applications: a running job represented with a
complex workow wants to verify that a certain ftp transfer proceeds regularly, in the present time.
Our focus on Grid system justies our interest for on-line monitoring, which bypasses CoMo core processes:
in CoMo terminology, our approach consists in passing data directly from the capture core process to the
user. In gd2 the intermediate transport architecture is completely transparent to data, that is never buered.
In CoMo data goes across three storage related core processes: export that manipulates and normalizes raw
data, storage that buers data for later reference, and a query front-end. From this perspective, the gd2
approach is orthogonal to CoMo, and gives precise answers to scalability concerns.
The npm infrastructure [10] is a pan-European proposal for network monitoring, and is presently
embedded in the gLite infrastructure, designed and implemented in the framework of the European Project
EGEE. npm is designed to provide two types of information: measurement data, in the form of data records
conforming to GGF standards, and metadata, indicating what kind of data are available for a given network
element. Such information is delivered to clients, whose role is typically to detect and diagnose network
performance problems.
The client submits its request to intermediate entities, the mediators through a web service interface.
Such request may either exhaustively describe a measurement series, or ask for the retrieval of metadata
about the measurements available for a given network element. In the former case, the requested data will be
delivered to the client, while in the latter the client will be presented with a list of available measurements
to choose from. In either case the mediator will use services oered by another kind of component, the
discoverer, which is in charge to either locate the requested data, or to produce the listing of available
sources. The source of the monitoring data is called framework, and it provides access to the tools that
extract network monitoring data. A detailed description of the above services is in [11].
npm strongly focuses on the accessibility of historical data: this makes a relevant dierence compared
to our perspective. In fact, since we mainly address data collected on demand, we necessarily exclude,
for performance reasons, a web service oriented architecture for the retrieval of measurements. Instead we
introduce a long lived communication entity, a stream. For the same reason we need not to address a large
database of collected data: data are delivered to interested users, without being stored anywhere (unless a
Client wants to do so). This avoids the need of indexing data, one of the functionalities associated to the
discoverer. In our architecture the discovery activity focuses on a far less complex task: determining where
to re the measurement session.
We conclude our discussion remarking that npm and gd2 in fact address two distinct problems, and each
of them is a poor solution when applied to the problem for which it has not been explicitly designed. npm
is designed to diagnose network problems once they have been detected, but has no detection tools: here we
present a framework that helps detecting a network problem, and possibly overcome its presence without
diagnosing its source. The npm has an extremely heavy footprint when used to receive real time updates
of the performance of a network element, which is needed to detect problems; our framework has no way to
explore the past of a measurement, tracking up to its cause.
Since their application domains are dierent, one may guess that they may live side-to-side in the same
infrastructure. We believe that this is possible, at least in perspective. For instance, a client in our framework
might be embedded in a npm framework: its request might consists of a long-lived, continuous monitoring
activity, and the ow of measurements might be recorded for future use of npm diagnostic tools. However,
such a publication modality cannot replace the stream introduced in gd2, when the client is an entity in
charge of monitoring the real time performance of an end-to-end path.
The approach presented in this paper is also complementary with the ipfix project [12]: the purpose of the
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ietf initiative is to design a protocol for ow metering data exchange between ipfix Devices (corresponding
to sensors in out framework) and ipfix Collectors (Clients in our framework). Such a protocol roughly
corresponds to the payload description in the Sensor to Client stream, and can be used whenever network
utilization has the characteristics of a ow. We plan to converge to an ipfix compliant architecture, and an
ipfix interface for the nprobe sensor is under work.
A topic that is apparently distant is the design of an infrastructure for network management. To this
purpose, the present Internet supports the snmp protocol, but a more advanced architecture [14] is actively
investigated. Such new architecture might integrate the infrastructure illustrated in this paper, embedding
the agent functionalities into the hosts dedicated to network management. In [16] we nd a transitional
network monitoring infrastructure, bridging from IPv4 to IPv6, which could easily host the functionalities
described in this paper.
A more structured framework envisions the integration of the infrastructure presented in this paper as
one aspect of an IaaS able to support complex workows. This option was announced in the Grid Infras-
tructure Architecture (GIA) presented in [3] and developed within the CoreGRID project: summarizing, the
GIA identies error recovery, security and accounting as non-functional requirements of a workow, and de-
scribes an architecture where they are implemented using an infrastructure where the workow management
processes have access to a number of appropriate services. Among such services Network Monitoring is pre-
sented as one that returns a stream of measurements in response to a request, according to the abstraction
presented in this paper.
Our work is marginally related to the vast literature on network monitoring tools: we mention two of them
that have remarkably inuenced our design. mapi [15] was used as a reference for passive network monitoring
tool during the conceptual design of our infrastructure [5], which was carried out in tight cooperation with
the FORTH Institute in Greece in the frame of the CoreGRID project. For the experimental deployment we
used ncap [6], an easy to use passive monitoring tool for which we implemented a custom plugin.
4 Evaluation, proof of concept and experiments
This section is divided into two parts. First we explore the scalability of the concepts upon which our
design is built, and next we introduce some experimental results that measure local footprints, like protocol
eciency, data rate for typical applications, CPU and memory usage for each session, collected using a Java
prototype on a testbed with a few agents in distant countries.
With the purpose of giving a denition of scalability, we dene a simplied context for an infrastructure
that provides the IaaS: the whole computational capacity C of the infrastructure (aggegating storage and
processors) is distributed over a network of nodes, and the number of nodes N grows linearly with the
capacity of the system.
In such a context, scalability means that we want to avoid data structures or computations whose com-
plexity grows faster than the computational capacity C: for instance, the case of one monitoring session for
each end-to-end path is not scalable.
After this premise, we give a simple proof of the scalability of our basic assumption: the workload of a
demand-driven network monitoring infrastructure is scalable, and it grows linearly with C. To simplify our
argument, we assume that C is made available in slices of comparable capacity: each server contributes with
one or more slices. Each workow is granted access to an average of k slices, and we assume that k is small
compared with, and independent from, the overall capacity C. As a consequence, the number of workows in
the system is large compared with, and linearly bound to, the number of slices (the computational capacity
of the whole Grid), and can be estimated as C=k. Now, consider that each workow submits a request for a
distinct monitoring session for each of the network elements connecting the slices allocated for it, whose upper
bound is estimated k2: note that this statement is valid as long as network monitoring is associated with the
resources allocated to the specic workow. We compute the number of network monitoring sessions in the
whole Grid as (C=k)  k2 = C  k, that concludes our proof: the workload associated to network monitoring
grows linearly with the capacity of the system.
The successive step is the analysis of the cost of each monitoring session. We split such cost into two
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Name Value Unit Sample size
Session duration 56331 seconds NA
Total gd2 trac 1.306 KBytes NA
gd2 payload trac 1.039 KBytes NA
gd2 protocol overhead 267 KBytes NA
gd2 protocol overhead (signatures) 240 KBytes NA
activation delay (max) 2028 msecs 10
stream jitter (average) 1.78 msecs 88
stream jitter (max) 9 msecs 88
Table 1: Summary of experimental results
parts, one related to the request from the client to the sensor, another to the management of the stream
from the sensor to the client.
The request is generated in a constant time, and its routing requires the existence of an infrastructure
similar to the DNS (or even based on it). Each hop entails the processing of part of the request description,
which accounts a log(N) complexity, assuming that resources are allocated in a balanced tree. Such price is
payed once during the lifetime of a session.
Each packet in the data stream has a similar footprint, in case it is routed using the reverse path as
indicated in the paper, while the payload is dependent on the kind of monitoring request, and does not
depend on N , the size of the system.
Therefore the cost of each monitoring session is log(N) over time. Such result, which is acceptable, may
be improved limiting the number of bounces, primarily in the reverse path: this can be obtained in case the
source routing in the reverse path is avoided, at the expenses of security.
This allows to localize our analysis to the single workow: the rate between the resources required (on
the average) by a workow, and those required by the network monitoring activity for the same workow
reects the overall footprint of network monitoring. An administrative advice might be to limit the data rate
associated with network monitoring for a given workow (a eld is provided for this purpose in the XSD) to
a fraction of the requested data rate.
To evaluate the soundness of our design, a prototype has been implemented: by proling its operation we
evaluate the footprint of a single session (a summary is in table 1). To develop the prototype we followed an
original approach that it is worth mentioning. We rst developed the software in a virtual testbed, built using
NETKIT [13], a tool based on the User Mode Linux technology. We took advantage of an environment where
restarting the system was practically feasible, and most conguration and runtime conditions where under
strict control and reproducible. This development phase lasted approximately 3 months, and was carried
out in the course of the Master Thesis of Yari Marchetti [9]. The adaptation to a real environment took
only a few weeks, and the result was presented in a public demonstration during the CoreGRID Industrial
Showcase in July 2008, in conjunction with OGF23. We used a testbed deployed between Italy and Greece
(thanks to the collaboration of the FORTH Institute in Crete), and the Client was resident on a laptop on
the meeting site. The same testbed has been used for the experiments reported below, but the Client was
connected to a POP of a commercial provider (TELECOM Italia).
To evaluate the eciency and the stability of the infrastructure, we inspect the trac generated by a
session that monitors a long ftp transfer. The monitoring session lasts more than 15 hours, and returns a
measurement of the data transfer rate every 15 seconds, using 3746 packets. The monitoring session measures
the data transfer rate from a given ip address to another ip address on a given port: during the session,
the data stream with monitoring data carries about 1:3 MBytes, divided into 1 MBytes of payload (i.e.,
measurements) and 300 KBytes of protocol overhead, corresponding to an eciency of the protocol, in this
specic case, around 75%. We observe that almost 90% of this overhead is related to security enforcement,
and used for signatures (64 Bytes each).
The trac generated overall is negligible, but protocol eciency is signicantly low. In order to reduce
such overhead, more measurement data should be included in the same packet, thus complicating the struc-
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ture of monitoring sessions: the interest for this option (which is supported by the current structure of the
protocol) seems limited, given the low data transfer rate required.
One local parameter that may interfere with usability is the delay between the production of the request,
and the activation of the measurement on the sensor. We measured such quantity in a set of 10 requests. The
request was produced by the Client, and forwarded by an intermediate agent to the nal agent that drives
the sensor: we measured times in the order of the seconds (maximum 2 seconds). The result is considered
acceptable, since relevant monitoring sessions usually last minutes, and therefore have time to complete their
setup.
Another parameter that may interfere with the usability of the measurements is the jitter of the delay
of packets composing the stream to the client. We observed an average jitter of 2 msecs in a small sample,
with maximum below 10 msecs, which is negligible for foreseen applications.
Finally, we consider the overhead on local resources: processing power and RAM. Since the footprint of a
single stream is not measurable, we stressed a obsolete laptop (hosting a Pentium 4, 1:5 GHz, 3000 BogoMips
with 500 MBytes RAM) installing both a Sensor and an Agent, and activating as many monitoring sessions
as possible, in the worst case where all session send data at the same time. The residual computing power
available for Agent operation was 15% of the CPU capacity, and was saturated with 160 streams, while
memory usage reached 50 MBytes. We extrapolate that a dual-core 2.4 GHz server might host about 1000
streams.
5 Conclusions
An end-to-end network monitoring infrastructure based on the concept of passive demand-driven sessions
allows system size to scale up indenitely: no matter how the interconnection infrastructure is organized,
the monitoring activity will take up a constant fraction of the capabilities of the Grid. Concerning the
capabilities spent in the management of a single activity, a log(N) term implies that, for each increment of
one order of magnitude of the capacity of the system, each monitoring session incurs in a constant increment
of workload dedicated to network monitoring. Such cost is the price paid to secure the infrastructure against
intruders, since at each step, packets need to be signed by the sender.
In order to reach such results we need a specic infrastructure made of specialized agents that manage
monitoring requests, submitted by clients and implemented by network sensors. Such an infrastructure
can be either overlaid on the existing Internet, or integrated in a next generation Internet management
infrastructure.
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Appendix { XSD Schemas
<complexType name="NetworkMonitoringSessionType">
<sequence>
<element name="RequestFrom"
type="nmsd:WorkflowMonitoringTaskType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element name="Schedule"
type="sched:NetworkMonitoringScheduleType"/>
<element name="Route"
type="nmsd:RouteStackType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="NetworkElement"
type="nmsd:NetworkElementType"/>
<element name="MeasurementStream"
type="nmsd:MeasurementStreamType"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="SessionId"
type="string"
use="required"/>
</complexType>
Table 2: Inter-agent part of the Network Monitoring Request Schema Description
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<complexType name="MeasurementStreamType">
<sequence>
<element name="CharacteristicStream"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element name="SamplePeriod"
type="float"
minOccurs="0"/>
<element name="Path"
type="path:NetworkMonitoringPathType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<choice>
<element name="PingOptions"
type="pt:PingOptionsType"/>
<element name="MAPIOptions"
type="am:MAPIMonitoringToolOptionsType"/>
<element name="OGFCharacteristics"
type="ogf:OGFCharacteristicsType"/>
</choice>
</sequence>
<attribute name="CharacteristicStreamId"
type="string"/>
</complexType>
</element>
</sequence>
</complexType>
Table 3: The measurement specic part of the Network Monitoring Request Schema Description
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